# Cross-Account Access

Cross-account access lets a human, application, or system in one cloud account use explicitly authorized resources or roles in another account.

Cloud concept. Updated 2026-10-29. Page: https://blowstack.com/tools/cloud-concepts-hub/cross-account-access

> Cloud accounts create administrative and security boundaries, but shared services, deployment pipelines, and operational teams often need controlled access across them. Cross-account access establishes that authorization without requiring shared credentials or moving resources into the same account.

Practice exams covering Cross-Account Access: [ANS-C01 AWS Certified Advanced Networking - Specialty](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-advanced-networking-specialty), [SOA-C03 AWS Certified CloudOps Engineer - Associate](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-cloudops-engineer-associate), [DEA-C01 AWS Certified Data Engineer - Associate](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-data-engineer-associate), [DVA-C02 AWS Certified Developer - Associate](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-developer-associate), [DOP-C02 AWS Certified DevOps Engineer - Professional](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-devops-engineer-professional), [MLA-C02 (beta) AWS Certified Machine Learning Engineer - Associate](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-machine-learning-engineer-associate), [SCS-C03 AWS Certified Security - Specialty](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-security-specialty), [SAA-C03 AWS Certified Solutions Architect - Associate](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-solutions-architect-associate), [SAP-C03 AWS Certified Solutions Architect - Professional](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-solutions-architect-professional).

## 6 key aspects of Cross-Account Access

Effective cross-account access combines explicit trust, narrowly scoped permissions, temporary credentials, contextual restrictions, and ongoing validation.

1. **Explicit authorization across account boundaries**: Define which external identities can perform which actions on which resources. Account ownership, organization membership, and network reachability do not independently grant access.
2. **Trust and permissions serve different purposes**: A role trust policy determines who may obtain a role session, while the role's permissions determine its capabilities. Diagnose role-assumption failures separately from authorization failures after assumption.
3. **Temporary, attributable credentials**: Prefer federation and workload roles over shared long-lived access keys. Use session names and source identity where supported to connect destination-account activity to the originating user or workload.
4. **Policy evaluation spans multiple controls**: Evaluate identity policies, resource policies, applicable organizational controls, permissions boundaries, and session restrictions. Check dependent resources such as encryption keys instead of assuming that access to the primary resource is sufficient.
5. **Conditional and least-privilege delegation**: Constrain access using specific principals, resource scopes, and supported context conditions. Use external IDs for appropriate third-party integrations and source-account or source-resource conditions for supported service-principal integrations.
6. **Continuous validation and lifecycle management**: Review external grants, test negative cases, and monitor cross-account activity. Plan for session expiration and revocation because changing trust alone does not necessarily invalidate credentials already issued.

## Cloud services for Cross-Account Access

IAM establishes cross-account trust and permissions, while STS supplies the temporary credentials used to act through destination roles. S3 illustrates direct resource-policy access, and KMS adds an independent authorization requirement when shared data is encrypted with a customer managed key. IAM Roles Anywhere extends temporary-credential patterns to external workloads. Verified Permissions can evaluate application-level access rules, but the application must enforce those decisions and still satisfy IAM authorization for AWS operations. Together, these services separate identity establishment, credential issuance, infrastructure permissions, and application authorization rather than treating one policy as sufficient for every layer.

- **[Amazon S3](https://blowstack.com/tools/cloud-services-hub/amazon-s3)**: S3 bucket policies can authorize principals from other accounts to access specified objects or bucket operations. Cross-account designs must also consider caller permissions, Object Ownership settings, and encryption-key authorization.
- **[Amazon Verified Permissions](https://blowstack.com/tools/cloud-services-hub/amazon-verified-permissions)**: Verified Permissions evaluates fine-grained application authorization policies, including application-defined account or tenant relationships. Its authorization decisions are separate from the IAM permissions and trust relationships required to call AWS APIs across accounts.

## Cross-Account Access exam questions

Real practice exam questions on Cross-Account Access, with the correct answer and its explanation.

### Question 1 (MLA-C02 (beta))

**Question:**

A model-governance team in AWS account A publishes a model artifact at s3://governed-models/releases/risk-v7/model.tar.gz. An automated evaluation application in account B runs with an IAM role named ModelEvaluator and must download this artifact by using its existing role credentials. The application does not need to list the bucket or access any other objects, and it must not assume a different role.

The bucket uses S3 Object Ownership with bucket owner enforced and SSE-S3 encryption. Neither the ModelEvaluator role nor the bucket policy currently grants access to the artifact. No explicit denies or other policy restrictions apply.

Which configuration grants the required cross-account access with least privilege?

**Correct answer:** Attach an identity policy to ModelEvaluator allowing s3:GetObject on the artifact's exact object ARN. Add a bucket policy allowing the same action on that object ARN with the ModelEvaluator role ARN as the principal.

**Explanation:** Direct cross-account S3 access requires authorization from both the caller's account and the resource owner's account. These policies authorize only ModelEvaluator to retrieve the specified artifact without granting listing, write, or unrelated object access. SSE-S3 does not require additional KMS permissions.

### Question 2 (SAP-C03)

**Question:**

A company aggregates application logs from its workload accounts through CloudWatch Logs subscriptions into an Amazon S3 bucket in a dedicated archive account. A security account runs investigation tools by using an IAM role named LogInvestigator. The tools must read archived objects directly with this role's credentials, without assuming a role in the archive account.

The archive bucket policy allows the security account principal, arn:aws:iam::222222222222:root, to perform s3:GetObject on arn:aws:s3:::central-log-archive/workloads/*. The security account's administrators are responsible for deciding which local identities can read these objects. The LogInvestigator role currently has only s3:ListBucket permission for the archive bucket, restricted to the workloads/ prefix. Listing succeeds, but downloading an existing object returns AccessDenied.

The bucket uses S3 Bucket owner enforced Object Ownership, and the objects use SSE-S3 encryption and are immediately retrievable. No applicable policy contains an explicit deny, and no permissions boundary, session policy, or Organizations policy restricts the requests.

Which change will allow the downloads while preserving the existing delegation model and least privilege?

**Correct answer:** Attach an identity-based policy to LogInvestigator that allows s3:GetObject on arn:aws:s3:::central-log-archive/workloads/*. Keep the existing bucket policy.

**Explanation:** The bucket owner has authorized the security account to access the objects. The security account can delegate that permission to LogInvestigator through an identity-based policy. Together, the bucket policy and role policy authorize cross-account reads, scoped to the required object prefix.

### Question 3 (SOA-C03)

**Question:**

A company runs maintenance automation in a central operations AWS account. The automation assumes MaintenanceRole in a production account and uses the returned temporary credentials to update an existing AWS CloudFormation stack.

The UpdateStack request fails with AccessDenied. A CloudOps engineer verifies the following configuration:
• The central automation role allows sts:AssumeRole on MaintenanceRole and cloudformation:UpdateStack on the production stack.
• MaintenanceRole trusts the central automation role, but its permissions policy allows only CloudFormation Describe and List actions.
• GetCallerIdentity confirms that the failed request uses a MaintenanceRole session in the production account.
• The stack's existing CloudFormation service role has all permissions required to provision the updated resources.
• No session policies, permissions boundaries, SCPs, or explicit denies restrict the request. All other required permissions are configured.

Which change will allow the automation to update the stack while maintaining least privilege?

**Correct answer:** Add cloudformation:UpdateStack permission for the specific production stack ARN to MaintenanceRole's permissions policy.

**Explanation:** After role assumption, the automation's requests are authorized using the production MaintenanceRole session, not the central automation role's permissions. Granting UpdateStack on the designated stack to MaintenanceRole supplies the missing permission without granting access to unrelated stacks.

### Question 4 (SCS-C03)

**Question:**

A company runs Amazon EC2 instances in a workload account. The unified Amazon CloudWatch agent must send application audit logs directly to a precreated CloudWatch Logs log group in a separate logging account, without first storing the logs in the workload account.

The agent is configured to assume a LogIngestionRole in the logging account. The EC2 instance profile role has an identity policy allowing sts:AssumeRole on that role. LogIngestionRole has permissions to create log streams and write events in the destination log group, but its trust policy currently allows only ec2.amazonaws.com to assume it. The agent reports an AccessDenied error for sts:AssumeRole. There are no applicable explicit denies, and network connectivity is working.

Which change will restore log delivery while granting the least-privilege cross-account access?

**Correct answer:** Replace the EC2 service principal in LogIngestionRole's trust policy with the ARN of the workload account's instance profile role, allowing that role to perform sts:AssumeRole.

**Explanation:** The agent initially uses credentials from the instance profile role. That IAM role—not the EC2 service principal—is the caller assuming LogIngestionRole. The source role already has permission to call sts:AssumeRole, so adding the specific source role to the destination role's trust policy completes the cross-account authorization. The assumed role's existing permissions then authorize log ingestion.

### Question 5 (DEA-C01)

**Question:**

A retail company governs an Amazon S3 data lake with AWS Lake Formation. The company grants SELECT and DESCRIBE permissions with grant option on a catalog table to a supplier's AWS account by using Lake Formation named-resource sharing. The accounts belong to different AWS Organizations organizations. The producer's cross-account sharing settings are configured correctly, and the grant succeeds.

A data lake administrator in the supplier account must make the shared table available through a resource link in the supplier's Data Catalog. The administrator has the required IAM and Lake Formation administrative permissions, but no one in the supplier account has completed the resource-sharing setup. The producer's catalog must remain authoritative, and the table metadata must not be copied.

What should the administrator do next?

**Correct answer:** Accept the resource share invitation in AWS Resource Access Manager in the supplier account, and then create a resource link to the shared table.

**Explanation:** Lake Formation uses AWS RAM for this cross-account sharing workflow. A recipient outside the producer's organization must accept the resource share invitation. The administrator can then create a resource link that references the producer's table without copying its metadata.

### Question 6 (DOP-C02)

**Question:**

A company has a custom Amazon EventBridge event bus in a central operations account. Several application accounts publish operational events to this bus. Rules created by the operations team must remain protected from changes by application teams.

A DevOps engineer must allow an automation role in one application account to create rules and manage their targets directly on the central bus. The role must also be able to update and delete rules created by its own account, but not rules created by the operations account. The automation must use its existing role credentials without assuming a role in the operations account. Target invocation permissions are already configured correctly, and no other policies grant the automation role access to the central bus.

Which authorization configuration meets these requirements?

**Correct answer:** Grant the automation role the required rule-management actions in its identity policy. Add a central event bus resource policy allowing that role the same actions on rules belonging to the bus, with a StringEqualsIfExists condition requiring events:creatorAccount to equal the application account ID.

**Explanation:** Cross-account management requires authorization in both the role's identity policy and the destination bus resource policy. The events:creatorAccount condition restricts management of existing rules to those created by the application account. StringEqualsIfExists also permits initial PutRule requests, when the new rule does not yet have a creator account. Rules created by the operations account have a different creator account and do not satisfy the condition.

### Question 7 (DVA-C02)

**Question:**

A company uses AWS CodePipeline in a tooling account to deploy an application to staging and then production. The production stage runs an AWS CodeBuild project in the tooling account. Its deployment script calls AWS STS AssumeRole to obtain temporary credentials for a deployment role in the production account, but the call returns AccessDenied.

The CodeBuild project's service role has an identity policy allowing sts:AssumeRole on the production deployment role. The production role has the required deployment permissions, but its trust policy allows only the service principal codebuild.amazonaws.com to assume it. No other policies deny the request.

Which change will allow the deployment script to obtain the required credentials?

**Correct answer:** Change the production deployment role's trust policy to allow the tooling account's CodeBuild project service role to perform sts:AssumeRole.

**Explanation:** Commands in the build environment run with credentials for the CodeBuild project's service role. Cross-account role assumption requires both permission for that caller to assume the destination role and a destination trust policy accepting the caller. The caller's identity policy already grants the required permission, so updating the trust policy completes the authorization.

### Question 8 (ANS-C01)

**Question:**

A company owns the Route 53 public hosted zone example.com in a networking account. A deployment pipeline in an application account runs as an IAM role named AppDeploy. After each deployment, the pipeline must UPSERT the A record api.example.com in the central hosted zone.

The networking team must retain ownership of the zone. The pipeline must not be able to change any other record name or record type, or perform DELETE operations. Long-lived credentials and delegation to a separate hosted zone are prohibited. Neither account currently has cross-account permissions configured, and no service control policies or permissions boundaries restrict the proposed solution.

Which configuration meets these requirements?

**Correct answer:** Create a DNS update role in the networking account that trusts AppDeploy. Allow AppDeploy to call sts:AssumeRole on that role. Grant the DNS update role route53:ChangeResourceRecordSets on the central hosted zone ARN, using ForAllValues:StringEquals conditions for the normalized record name api.example.com, record type A, and change action UPSERT. Have the pipeline use the assumed role's temporary credentials.

**Explanation:** The source role's AssumeRole permission and the destination role's trust policy establish cross-account access. The destination role's permissions govern the resulting session. Scoping ChangeResourceRecordSets to the hosted zone and applying the Route 53 normalized-record-name, record-type, and change-action condition keys restricts every change in a submitted batch to the required A-record UPSERT.

### Question 9 (SAA-C03)

**Question:**

A company stores shared engineering documents in an Amazon S3 bucket in a central AWS account. IAM roles in several accounts in the company's AWS Organizations organization access the bucket directly. Existing identity policies and bucket policy statements grant the required access, including grants to specific roles in individual accounts.

The security team requires that an account immediately lose access to the bucket if the account leaves the organization, even if an existing bucket policy statement still grants its roles access. Authorized roles in accounts that remain in the organization must retain their access. The control must automatically cover changes in organization membership without maintaining account lists. No AWS service principals access this bucket.

Which solution meets these requirements?

**Correct answer:** Add a bucket policy statement that denies s3:* for all principals on the bucket and its objects when aws:PrincipalOrgID does not equal the company's organization ID.

**Explanation:** The aws:PrincipalOrgID condition key identifies the requesting principal's organization. An explicit deny using StringNotEquals overrides existing allows when the principal's account is outside the organization, including after an account leaves. Requests from authorized roles that remain in the organization are not denied by this statement.

## Practice Cross-Account Access in a full exam

Questions on Cross-Account Access in each practice exam, with every answer option and an explanation for each:

- [SOA-C03](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-cloudops-engineer-associate): 25 questions
- [DOP-C02](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-devops-engineer-professional): 25 questions
- [SAP-C03](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-solutions-architect-professional): 22 questions
- [SAA-C03](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-solutions-architect-associate): 14 questions
- [ANS-C01](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-advanced-networking-specialty): 13 questions
- [DEA-C01](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-data-engineer-associate): 9 questions
- [SCS-C03](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-security-specialty): 8 questions
- [DVA-C02](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-developer-associate): 6 questions
- [MLA-C02 (beta)](https://blowstack.com/practice-exams/aws-certified-machine-learning-engineer-associate): 3 questions

## What is Cross-Account Access

Cross-account access connects identities and resources across independently administered cloud accounts. Typical examples include a deployment pipeline updating production infrastructure, a security team inspecting application accounts, and an analytics application reading data owned by another business unit. The objective is to preserve account isolation while granting specific capabilities to identified callers under defined conditions. Network connectivity alone does not provide this authorization, and belonging to the same organization does not automatically establish access.

Two common implementation patterns are assuming a role in the destination account and granting an external principal access through a resource policy. With role assumption, the caller obtains temporary credentials representing a destination-account role. With direct resource access, the caller keeps its existing identity while the resource owner authorizes it. Choose according to the service's policy support, the operations required, and whether centralized destination-account permissions simplify administration.

In AWS, cross-account role assumption normally requires an identity policy in the source account permitting sts:AssumeRole on the target role and a trust policy on that role accepting the caller. The trust policy controls who can assume the role; the role's permissions policies control what the resulting session can do. Trusting an account principal delegates authority to that account's administrators rather than granting every identity in that account automatic access. For example, a development pipeline can assume a production deployment role whose permissions allow updates only to a designated application.

After assumption, requests use the destination role's session, not the original caller's permissions. Session policies can further restrict that session, while applicable permissions boundaries, service control policies, resource control policies, resource policies, and explicit denies can affect authorization. An allow in one policy does not override an applicable explicit deny. Troubleshooting should therefore distinguish a failed AssumeRole request from a successful assumption followed by a denied resource operation.

For direct cross-account resource access, AWS generally requires permission from both the caller's account and the resource-owning account. For example, reading another account's S3 object generally requires an identity-policy allow for the reader and a bucket-policy allow for that principal. If the object is encrypted with a customer managed KMS key, the caller also needs the relevant KMS permissions, and the key policy must permit the cross-account use. Access to the bucket does not implicitly grant access to its encryption key.

Conditions make trust narrower and more practical. Restrict principals, actions, resources, and, where supported, organization membership or principal attributes. Require MFA for appropriate human workflows. For third-party role assumption, an external ID helps prevent confused-deputy attacks, but it is not a secret or a substitute for a trusted principal. For supported AWS service-to-service requests, source-account and source-resource conditions help prevent unintended use of a service principal.

Human users should generally enter through federation and obtain short-lived role sessions. Applications running in AWS should use workload roles rather than embedded access keys. External servers can use IAM Roles Anywhere to obtain temporary credentials using trusted X.509 certificates; a separate cross-account role assumption can then provide destination access when required. IAM paths organize identities and can support policy matching, but paths are not security boundaries. Amazon Verified Permissions addresses application-level authorization decisions; it does not replace IAM trust policies or grant access to AWS resources by itself.

The trade-off is additional policy coordination and operational complexity. Keep grants narrow, record role sessions with attributable names or source identity, inspect CloudTrail events, and use IAM Access Analyzer to identify unintended external access. Test both permitted and denied scenarios, including expired sessions and missing encryption permissions. Removing trust prevents new sessions, but existing temporary credentials may remain usable until expiration unless separately restricted or revoked through supported controls.

## Learn Cross-Account Access in lessons

8 short lessons on Cross-Account Access in 7 certification courses.

- MLA-C02 (beta): Cross-Account Access: least-privilege artifact sharing (Premium), https://app.blowstack.com/lessons/cross-account-access-least-privilege-artifact-sharing-mla-c02
- SAP-C03: Cross-Account Access: two-sided authorization (Premium), https://app.blowstack.com/lessons/cross-account-access-two-sided-authorization-sap-c03
- SOA-C03: Cross-Account Access: roles for shared monitoring (Premium), https://app.blowstack.com/lessons/cross-account-access-roles-for-shared-monitoring-soa-c03
- SCS-C03: Cross-Account Access: two-sided authorization (Premium), https://app.blowstack.com/lessons/cross-account-access-two-sided-authorization-scs-c03
- DEA-C01: Cross-Account Access: permissions for encrypted data (Premium), https://app.blowstack.com/lessons/cross-account-access-permissions-for-encrypted-data-dea-c01
- DOP-C02: Cross-Account Access: authorization across deployment accounts (Premium), https://app.blowstack.com/lessons/cross-account-access-authorization-across-deployment-accounts-dop-c02
